After nearly a decade of sky-high prices, new generics have sent the price of the HIV prevention drug PrEP plummeting. What kept it so expensive for so long, and will the price drop help us finally eradicate HIV?
Listen to the full episode below, read the transcript or scroll down for more information.
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The Basics: A Pill to Prevent HIV
The FDA approved Truvada in 2012 as the first pill that could be used to prevent HIV, also known as pre-exposure prophylaxis or PrEP. Truvada was developed by California-based Gilead Sciences first as an HIV treatment before studies funded by the Centers for Disease Prevention and Control, National Institutes of Health and the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation found it to be highly effective in preventing HIV when taken every day.
Scientists and public health officials hailed the discovery as a breakthrough in the fight against HIV, and PrEP figured prominently in both Obama and Trump administration efforts to reduce new HIV infections.
But since the beginning, only a small fraction of the 1.2 million people with the highest risk of contracting HIV — including gay and bisexual men, anyone with an HIV positive sex partner, transgender women and people who inject drugs — have taken it. Chances of contracting HIV are much higher for people who are Black, Hispanic or live in the South, but PrEP use among these groups is often much lower.
~99%
Estimated effectiveness of PrEP at preventing sexual transmission of HIV when taken daily¹
20%
Percent of people on PrEP of the 1.2 million recommended by the CDC²
36,326
People newly infected with HIV in the U.S. in 2019²
High Costs: A Case Study in Drug Pricing
Activists and lawmakers often point to the high cost of PrEP as a key reason for its low use. In 2012, Gilead set the price for Truvada as PrEP at more than $14,000 per year, and it is now more than $22,000.
Gilead has made $19.5 billion on Truvada since 2012 (including PrEP and treatment), but many consumers pay little to nothing for the drug. Medicare, Medicaid and private insurers pick up much of the cost, and Gilead’s copay assistance program has helped many people with private insurance cover deductibles and other out-of-pocket costs. (As of 2021, private insurers are required by the Affordable Care Act to cover PrEP with no out-of-pocket costs.) People without insurance can access free PrEP from Gilead or the federal government.
There is no broad-based evidence linking the price of PrEP to low uptake, but small surveys and anecdotal evidence indicate the drug’s cost has prevented some people from accessing or continuing to use PrEP.
Below are several common pharmaceutical industry practices used to maintain high prices and how Gilead employed them in the case of Truvada.
Patent Protection
Big Picture: The U.S. government grants patents to drug companies for a set period of time — usually 20 years — to market their product at any price without competition. This monopoly period is designed to incentivize companies to develop new, innovative treatments.
Manufacturers often extend or add additional patents onto their drug, which can make it more difficult for generic competition to enter. Generic manufacturers can challenge patents, but it is expensive and time-consuming.
Gilead: Gilead holds 14 patents on Truvada’s two core ingredients and their combination, which last until 2024. The company says their patents are strong, but Israeli generics manufacturer Teva challenged two Truvada patents in 2008. The federal government is also suing Gilead, alleging the company has been infringing on the CDC’s patents for Truvada based on clinical trials the CDC conducted on the drug in the mid-2000s.
Pay for Delay
Big Picture: Generic drugmakers are allowed to challenge patents in hopes of entering the market before a branded drug’s patents expire. These challenges are typically settled out of court in agreements that are secret. These agreements can include so-called “pay-for-delay” deals where branded companies pay generics to stay out of the market. Pay-for-delay has become less common since a 2013 Supreme Court decision, but it does still happen and can cost consumers billions in higher drug prices.
Gilead: Gilead and Teva settled their court case in 2014. The settlement allowed Teva to introduce a generic version of Truvada in September 2020, before Gilead’s patents expired but after Teva could’ve entered the market had the generic manufacturer prevailed in court. Gilead denies paying Teva as part of the settlement. In March 2021, New Mexico filed a lawsuit alleging the settlement included pay-for-delay.
Product Hopping
Big Picture: When a drug reaches the end of its patent life and is facing imminent generic competition, drug companies have been known to move patients to a similar drug that is still under patent. This is known as “product hopping,” and critics argue these switches are driven more by profit motives as opposed to any clinical benefits.
Gilead: In 2019, Gilead received FDA approval for a new version of PrEP called Descovy and began marketing it to patients and physicians as a safer alternative. Descovy includes a slightly different version of one of the main ingredients in Truvada. Clinical studies show both pills are safe and equally effective. Truvada can cause kidney and bone problems in a small number of people, and Descovy can lead to increased cholesterol and cardiovascular issues.
Gilead says 46% of Truvada patients have switched to Descovy since it was introduced. Descovy’s list price is more than $26,000 for a year’s supply and has patent protection until at least 2025, compared to generic Truvada, which is available for less than $1,000 per year.
(In addition to Gilead’s safety-focused marketing for Descovy as PrEP, many HIV physicians and researchers say online ads for a class-action lawsuit alleging safety concerns about Truvada as an HIV treatment also contributed to people stopping or choosing not to start taking Truvada for PrEP.)
More Than Costs: Additional Barriers to PrEP Use
According to HIV/AIDS physicians and researchers, price is one of several barriers that have kept PrEP use consistently low. Scroll over or tap on the cards below for more details.
Access to Health Care
Research shows PrEP use is lower in states that have not expanded Medicaid and in counties with more people who are uninsured. PrEP clinics are also often not in the areas with the greatest need.
Awareness
PrEP awareness is high among gay and bisexual men, but research shows awareness among other at-risk groups — including straight women — is much lower. Many primary care providers are also unfamiliar with PrEP.
Stigma
Interviews, focus groups and surveys suggest some people avoid PrEP because of perceived stigmas around homosexuality, sexual promiscuity and HIV.
Adherence
Even people who start taking PrEP often struggle to keep using it, and physicians report many PrEP prescriptions go unfilled.
Additional Costs
PrEP requires quarterly doctor visits and lab costs that often must be paid out-of-pocket. These costs can total hundreds of dollars a year.
The Uncertain Impact of Cheap Generics
Teva introduced the first generic version of Truvada in the U.S. on September 30, 2020, as a result of its deal with Gilead. The company priced its pill only a few hundred dollars below Gilead’s, a common move for first generics. As of April 22, at least nine generic versions of Truvada had been approved in the U.S., with many already stocked on pharmacy shelves in major U.S. cities for around $80 with a coupon from the website GoodRx.
Cheaper pills could allow public health departments to establish or expand programs that provide free PrEP. Yet activists, researchers and providers are unsure whether widely available low-cost generics will lead to a spike in the number of people on PrEP.
Many HIV clinics worry generic entry could actually harm their prevention efforts. Clinics currently purchase Truvada or Descovy at large discounts (through the 340B Program), while charging a patient’s insurance the full amount. That difference — often around $1,000 — funds clinic operations including staffing, lab work, outreach programs and care for the uninsured. If insurers only pay for generics, as some have begun to do, clinics will lose a significant source of funding.
This episode is part of a series on health care prices supported in part by West Health.
¹Effectiveness of Prevention Strategies to Reduce the Risk of Acquiring or Transmitting HIV, CDC (PrEP is 74 – 84% effective at preventing HIV in people who inject drugs)
²Core Indicators for Monitoring the Ending the HIV Epidemic Initiative (Preliminary Data), CDC
Episode Transcript and Resources
Episode Transcript
Dan Gorenstein: Something dramatic happened at the end of March.
The price of a pill virtually guaranteed to prevent HIV plummeted.
Tim Horn: We’ve already seen close to a 90 percent price reduction.
DG: Pharmaceutical giant Gilead had created a revolutionary pill, Truvada, often called PrEP.
And with no competition, Gilead had named its price for nearly a decade.
Rep. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez: In Australia PrEP is $8 a month. In the United States it’s almost $2,000 a month.
DG: But only a fraction of the people recommended to be on PrEP take it.
And about 35,000 people still get HIV every year in the U.S.
Now that generics are finally hitting the market, you can buy PrEP for around $80 a month.
For better and for worse, this is how our drug system works.
Today, we look back at how Gilead kept prices so high for so long and whether cheaper drugs will finally increase access.
From the studio at the Leonard Davis Institute at the University of Pennsylvania, I’m Dan Gorenstein, and this is Tradeoffs.
*****
DG: I’m joined today by Tradeoffs producer Ryan Levi, who has spent more than a month digging into this.
And he is going to help us rewind the tape, so to speak, to see what we can learn from the story of Truvada and Gilead.
Nice to have you here, Ryan.
Ryan Levi: Good to be here, Dan.
DG: To really appreciate how far we’ve come when it comes to HIV and AIDS, Ryan, let’s go back to when the HIV/AIDS crisis first started in the U.S. in the 1980s.
RL: It was a really dark and scary time for a lot of people.
Larry Kramer: Jane, can you imagine what it must be like if you had lost 20 of your friends in the last 18 months?
Jane Pauley: No.
RL: Hospital wards in major cities were full of mostly gay men wasting away and dying. Entire communities were devastated.
Jane Pauley: And you don’t know why?
Larry Kramer: No cause, no cure, people in hospitals. It’s a very angry community.
RL: In 1992, AIDS was the leading cause of death for men 25-44.
By 1995, more than 260,000 people had died.
Right around then is when really effective treatments for HIV/AIDS finally hit the market.
These were complicated combinations of pills with nasty side-effects.
But they worked — the death rate from AIDS dropped by two-thirds within just a few years.
And treatments kept getting better and better.
DG: And presumably, this is where Truvada enters the picture.
RL: Right. Gilead introduced Truvada in 2004 as an HIV treatment and within three years, it was their best-selling product.
By the end of the decade it had made them nearly $8 billion. And as a company that launched only in the late ’80s as a biotech startup in California, this really catapulted Gilead into the sphere of a pharma juggernaut.
DG: $8 billion. That is some serious money. And you said that was for HIV treatment.
But today, we’re talking about Truvada as PrEP, short for pre-exposure prophylaxis.
So first, can you walk us through how Truvada went from treatment to prevention?
RL: So researchers had been floating this idea from the beginning, Dan.
And in the mid-to-late 2000s, the federal government funded and ran a couple of clinical trials to test the theory.
Gilead offered some guidance and support and donated the pills for the studies.
DG: And that’s normal, right. A drug company using government funded research to develop their products.
RL: Definitely. Normally, though, it happens earlier on, like the government figures out the basic science and then pharma turns it into an actual treatment.
DG: Got it, go on.
RL: Right, so the big news came at the end of 2010.
Judy Woodruff: A global study of high risk gay men found that daily doses of the drug Truvada cut their chance of infection by as much as 70%.
RL: TIME Magazine called it the medical breakthrough of the year.
Anthony Fauci called it “huge.”
And in 2012, the FDA approved Truvada as PrEP.
DG: And how excited were people about PrEP? I mean, it sounds like this changed the game.
RL: That was definitely the hope.
The Obama administration had just set a goal of cutting new infections 25% by 2015.
President Barack Obama: We’re here because we believe that while HIV transmission rates in this country are not as high as they once were, every new case is one case too many.
RL: And, really, people thought PrEP could be the missing piece, you know, the thing that would help us finally eradicate this virus.
But very, very few people started taking it, and a lot of people were blaming the price tag.
Facui: If you look at a person taking Truvada for an entire year, the price range is somewhere between $12,000-$14,000 a year. It’s not an inexpensive drug.
RL: Dan, these twin issues — high cost and low uptake — have been at the heart of the Truvada story ever since.
Today, fewer than 20% of the 1.2 million people the CDC says should be on PrEP actually take it.
This includes gay men, anyone with an HIV positive sex partner, transgender women and people who use injection drugs.
Half of new cases in 2018 were in the South, and most of those cases were among Black and Hispanic people, groups where PrEP use is much lower.
By the way, we still haven’t hit that goal Obama set for reducing new infections.
DG: And so, the list price for Truvada was $14,000 about 10 years ago when the drug hit the market. What is it now?
RL: Around $22,000.
DG: And what are people typically paying?
RL: So most people, not all but most, usually end up paying very little or nothing out of pocket.
That’s because insurers including Medicare and Medicaid are picking up most of the tab, and Gilead has a program to help people with private insurance pay their copays or deductibles.
For people without insurance, Gilead has donated enough pills to the federal government to cover 200,000 people for the next decade, and the company also runs its own assistance program.
DG: So you just said health policy folks think high prices are a big reason why so few people take the drug. But lots of people aren’t paying that much out of pocket. What’s going on?
RL: This is an important question. Even though there’s all this focus on cost, there’s no clear-cut evidence that proves price is keeping people off PrEP.
There’s a CDC study that estimated just 7% of people who should be on PrEP struggle to afford it.
So there’s that.
But at the same time, as I just said, only 20% of people are on the drug, and there are surveys and tons of one-off stories of people who didn’t start PrEP or stopped taking it because of the cost.
DG: So it sounds like one way or the other, maybe not causal, but there’s some connection between all these people not taking PrEP and how much Gilead has charged.
RL: Obviously Gilead disagrees with that framing, but it’s certainly a piece of the puzzle.
High drug prices have always been a part of our country’s history in trying to fight HIV.
And looking back on the prices Gilead set for PrEP and why they’ve stayed so high is an important part of that history and a useful case study in how our drug pricing system works.
DG: Ok, Ryan, so why have these prices stayed so high?
RL: Well there are three big things, and as you know, Dan, I’m a big fan of acronyms to help me remember things, so I came up with P-S-A.
DG: P-S-A. Public service announcement, Ryan?
RL: You got it. I feel like we see our stories as a kind of public service announcement, so I thought it fit.
DG: Ok, great. So I guess we’ll start with the letter P.
RL: Right. P is for patents.
If I only had one word to answer your question, Dan, it would be patents.
Because that’s what really drives the prices we all pay for prescription drugs.
Patents are also very complicated, so to really understand their role in this story…
Robin Feldman: What do you need?
RL: I needed some help.
RF: I’m on the faculty at University of California, Hastings
RL: The first person I talked to was Law Professor Robin Feldman.
RF: And I run a think tank at the law school called the Center for Innovation.
RL: Robin’s work focuses a lot on drug patents and drug pricing.
And she says when companies come up with a new scientific discovery, the U.S. Patent Office slaps a patent on it, and the drugmaker gets a monopoly — usually about 20 years.
Dan, this is when they can charge whatever they want without competition, and it’s an incentive for the companies to develop new, innovative treatments.
RF: And after that, cheaper drugs should be able to enter the market and drive the price down.
RL: That is the straightforward part of patents.
Then we get into what you might call the gamesmanship.
One common move, Robin says, is for companies to file a bunch of patents on a single drug.
RF: You can think of them as walls or you can think of them as a bag of weapons that you can throw at a potential competitor one after another. The more you have, the harder it is for cheaper drugs to get to market.
RL: People call this patent thicketting, and the idea is that the longer it takes for generics to enter, the longer the original company keeps making top dollar.
RF: All the company needs is one, to block the generic out. So if you’ve got 10, 15, 20, you’ve got a lot greater chance that something will stand and hold off the competition as long as possible.
DG: And, Ryan, how many patents does Gilead have for Truvada?
RL: 14, with protection lasting through 2024.
Now Gilead, for its part, says these patents are based on their scientific discoveries. They’re what they should have.
And they say it’s natural that Truvada is going to have several patents because it’s combining two separate ingredients.
In other words, nothing to see here.
But there’s at least one court case against Gilead that suggests that there is something to see here.
Robin says it’s common for courts to get involved in these kinds of cases because not all patents are created equal.
RF: Patent examiners have a limited amount of time and limited resources to look at each patent that comes through. Some of those patents and protections may be weak. So we have historically relied on the court system to sort these issues out.
DG: When we come back, Gilead goes to court, pushes a new pill, and we look ahead to a world of cheap and plentiful PrEP.
BREAK
DG: Welcome back.
We’re here with Tradeoffs producer Ryan Levi who is running us through a drug pricing case study focused on Gilead’s HIV prevention medication Truvada.
Ryan, you just told us about the key role patent protection played in the high price of the drug. That was the P in your PSA.
And you were about to tell us about how some of Gilead’s patents got challenged in court, which I assume gets us to S?
RL: Right. S is for settlement as in settling a lawsuit.
Remember, Dan, how I was telling you that not all patents are created equal?
DG: Yeah.
RL: So of those 14 patents Gilead has on Truvada, the Israeli generic drugmaker Teva challenged two of them.
Teva argued that those two should be thrown out because the inventions they claimed to cover were included in earlier Truvada patents.
DG: So basically patents are supposed to be for new discoveries, things that have never been patented before.
And Teva was saying in court that Gilead had effectively patented the same science a few times.
RL: Right, and in 2014, the two sides settled, but the details of the agreement are secret.
All we know is that Gilead eventually said that as part of the settlement, Teva would launch a generic version of Truvada in September 2020.
DG: So, September 2020, that’s before Gilead’s patents would’ve expired, but also several years after Teva could’ve hit the market, had the company won their case in court against Gilead.
RL: Exactly. And that’s presumably why Teva made this deal — trade the uncertainty of winning a court challenge and getting to enter the market right away for the certainty of entering the market a few years down the line.
Which makes sense.
But there’s another reason, that a different patent expert I talked to raised as a possibility.
Tahir Amin: Hi, my name’s Tahir Amin, I’m the co-founder and co-executive director of an organization called the Initiative for Medicines, Access and Knowledge.
RL: Tahir’s a patent lawyer who co-runs I-MAK, a research organization that pushes for lower priced drugs by focusing on patent reform.
He told me about something known as pay-for-delay.
TA: Many of these settlements usually the branded company will tell the generic company, why don’t you delay your entry, we’ll pay you X million dollars, maybe even a billion.
RL: Now I want to be clear: Gilead told us Teva received no payment in this deal, and Teva did not respond for comment.
But in March, the state of New Mexico filed a lawsuit alleging there was pay-for-delay here.
Obviously, that will have to work its way through the courts, but big picture, pay-for-delay is right out of the pharma playbook.
TA: They know they’re going to get a chunk of change to sort of wait for an extra year or two, generic gets a nice sort of golden handshake. So it works out for both generics and the brand company that’s holding the patents.
RL: A 2010 Federal Trade Commision study found, on average, these pay-for-delay deals give brand drugs an extra 17 months of exclusivity, and, in total, they cost consumers an extra $3.5 billion a year in higher drug costs.
DG: Ryan, before we get to that final letter, I want to take stock for a minute.
How much money did Gilead make on Truvada as PrEP from 2012, when it hit the market, until the first generic arrived in the fall of 2020?
RL: We don’t have them broken out, but total Truvada sales for PrEP and treatment in the U.S. were $19.5 billion.
DG: And how many new HIV infections were there over that same time period?
RL: Through 2019, around 300,000.
DG: Given like you’ve already said, there is no empirical evidence that draws a straight line from price to people not being on PrEP, how do you think about those two numbers?
RL: They’re both part huge parts of the story, Dan.
We’ve made a lot of progress on HIV but people are still getting sick.
And Gilead has made a lot of money on a prevention drug that most people aren’t using.
The tricky thing is how related are they?
And the truth is we just don’t have as clear an answer as we’d like.
DG: Okay you’ve got one letter left in your PSA.
What does A stand for?
RL: A stands for “A new pill.”
Back when Gilead was first developing the ingredients for Truvada in the early 2000s, Tahir says they were also doing research on another, slightly different version of one of the ingredients.
TA: This was around 2004 and it actually showed some slight benefits, like, for example, you could get higher antiviral potency at a lower dose. But then they just totally scratched it. It just went dead.
RL: At the time, the company issued a press release saying they didn’t think this new ingredient was different enough from the one in Truvada to keep developing it.
But in 2010, Gilead dusted it off and started working on it again and turned it into a new drug called Descovy, which they got FDA approval first as treatment and then as PrEP in 2019.
DG: That’s right before Truvada was set to go generic.
RL: Right and a lot of advocates and doctors I talked to don’t think that was a coincidence.
TA: This is a common business strategy pharmaceutical companies use. We call this sort of product switching or product hopping. They basically will take an existing product, slightly modify it and switch it over to a new one because they now have a new generation of patents so they could keep off competition.
RL: Gilead says they started working on Descovy again because they thought it could be a better and safer treatment option.
And a lot of their marketing around Descovy as PrEP also really focused on safety.
But that emphasis really bothered a lot of HIV physicians.
Oni Blackstock: It was super, super frustrating because like, you know, many of us knew that Truvada was a very fine and really excellent medication.
RL: Oni Blackstock is a primary care and HIV physician in New York City.
And she was seeing patients and running the city’s HIV response out of the health department when Descovy came out.
OB: People already had all this information that they had received about this newer, safer medication that either friends had told them about or that they had, you know, seen a commercial about…
Descovy Ad: Step Up, PrEP Up. Descovy is the newest way to PrEP.
OB: …you know, how it was different from Truvada, which more folks were familiar with. It just felt like pushing against this huge storm of information.
RL: There were ads on TV and online.
The wildest piece of this for me is if you go to truvada.com, the first thing you see is a pop-up offering for a “new prescription option.” Which of course is Descovy.
And to be clear, Truvada and Descovy are both very safe.
I talked with several doctors who told me they’d likely recommend Descovy for patients with pre-existing bone or kidney issues.
But for the vast majority of people, evidence from Gilead’s own clinical trial found Descovy and Truvada equally effective at preventing HIV.
And now that the price of generic Truvada is plummeting there’s no financial reason to pay around $2,200 a month for Descovy.
And yet, Gilead’s campaign has worked.
The company says 46% of people who had been on Truvada are now on Descovy, which has patents that go until at least 2025.
DG: Ok. there’s lots of people on Descovy, the new brand on the block, but there’s all this new generic competition now too. So prices, I’m sure, are falling fast.
RL: Yep. In 48 hours, the price of PrEP dropped more than 90%, Dan.
DG: Damn.
RL: Right? It’s not like that everywhere, but I looked around and with a coupon from the online discount site GoodRx, you can get generic Truvada for around $80 a month in all the biggest U.S. cities.
And I talked with one pharmacy in San Francisco that’s as low as $36.60.
Tim Horn: It basically is a race to the bottom now.
RL: Tim Horn is the director of health care access at the National Alliance of State and Territorial AIDS Directors.
He says it’ll take some time for everyone to see these new low generic prices, but cheaper, affordable PrEP has definitely arrived.
DG: I’m curious, Ryan, how optimistic are people like Tim Horn that lots more people will take PrEP and we’ll see a real drop in the 35,000 Americans who get HIV every year?
RL: So no one I talked to thinks that high prices alone explain the PrEP problem — not providers, not activists, not researchers, nobody.
There’s a whole web of barriers.
There are still a lot of people who don’t know about PrEP, or they think it’s not for them because they already take enough precautions or because they’re not gay.
And there are still millions of people who don’t have health insurance in this country — especially in the dozen states that haven’t expanded Medicaid — making access that much harder.
Putting that aside, one concrete thing Tim thinks will change is it’s now going to be a lot easier for public health departments to get PrEP out there.
TH: We’ve certainly heard from health departments that would like to be able to purchase PrEP at prices that are considerably more affordable than those available to brand name products to give to a university clinic, to give to a Department of Corrections program, to donate to a community program.
RL: So that would definitely help those people you were talking about, Dan, but there’s a potential downside too.
A lot of HIV clinics right now can buy Truvada or Descovy at a big discount, but are allowed to charge a patient’s insurance for the full amount.
That difference — about a thousand bucks — funds their clinic covering labs, outreach work, and care for the uninsured.
But these safety-net clinics are worried that if insurers switch to only paying for generics, as some already have, the clinics will lose a lot of money.
It’s just too early to know how this will all shake out.
DG: Fair enough. As we enter this new Truvada chapter, Ryan, given all of your reporting what’s your big takeaway? How should we think about the story of Truvada?
RL: I think there are three things.
The first is actually a quote from New York Congresswoman Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez. This is from back in 2019 when she was talking to Gilead’s CEO Daniel O’Day at a congressional hearing on the cost of PrEP.
Ocasio-Cortez: This isn’t about you as an individual or who you are or your character. This is about the system of incentives we have set up. And when it comes to who to blame for this, I don’t blame you. I blame us.
RL: Yes, Gilead got their patents, they delayed generic entry, and they’re pushing out Descovy.
And it’s really tempting to boil this down to a greedy drug company putting profits over a million people who still aren’t taking this drug. And that narrative is out there.
But this is the U.S. drug system in action. This is the basic contract the U.S. has made with drug companies.
DG: What do you mean by contract?
RL: So this is the second takeaway.
Craig Garthwaite: At the center of the pharmaceutical pricing discussion is a tradeoff between the access to the drug today and the access to new drugs in the future.
RL: I talked with Craig Garthwaite. He’s an economist at the Kellogg School of Management at Northwestern, and he generally believes the innovation we get is worth the high prices we pay.
CG: We need to provide the incentives for firms to want to develop treatments in the first place. And the way we do that is through prices that mean that some people don’t get access to treatments that exist.
RL: Basically in this contract, we’re agreeing that Gilead should have a financial incentive to find a cure for HIV in the future and that is worth some people not being able to afford PrEP today.
But this is the core tension in drug pricing debates and in this Truvada case: How big does the financial incentive have to be to still get these breakthrough treatments?
Is there room to bring down prices and preserve the innovation we want the most?
A lot of people in Washington think there is that room.
My last take away brings me back to Tim Horn.
Because regardless of what’s happened before, we are now entering a new chapter in HIV prevention.
TH: We’ve never really gotten a chance just to see what the impact of a low cost generic can actually make in terms of really scaling up access.
RL: And that’s why I’m so interested to see what happens with these new generics over the next few months because this is uncharted territory.
Are we finally going to see that huge jump in the number of people getting on PrEP?
You know, the federal government has a new HIV goal — cut new infections 90% by the end of the decade.
And there’s a lot of excitement and hope that cheap PrEP helps us finally get rid of this virus.
DG: And it’s a story I know we’ll be following.
Ryan, thanks so much for this.
RL: Happy to do it, Dan.
DG: I’m Dan Gorenstein. This is Tradeoffs.
Episode Resources
Selected Reporting on PrEP:
- Strides Against HIV/AIDS In The U.S. Falter As Resources Diverted To Fight COVID-19 (Sarah Varney, Kaiser Health News, 4/21/2021)
- Many Health Plans Now Must Cover Full Cost of Expensive HIV Prevention Drugs (Michelle Andrews, Kaiser Health News, 1/5/2021)
- Gilead’s Truvada faces Teva generics assault amid Descovy switching campaign (Kyle Blankenship, FiercePharma, 10/2/2020)
- Will the newest pill for HIV prevention fuel progress — or profits? (Douglas Krakower, Kenneth Katz and Julia L. Marcus; STAT; 2/26/2020)
- Untangling the Trump administration’s lawsuit over an HIV prevention drug (Jon Cohen, Science, 11/8/2019)
- This Drug Could End HIV. Why Hasn’t It? (Michael Barbaro, Eric Krupke, Luke Vander Ploeg and Adiza Eghan; The Daily; 6/5/2019)
- This HIV pill saves lives. So why is it so hard to get in the Deep South? (Lenny Bernstein, New York Times, 3/11/2019)
- Why Is No One on the First Treatment to Prevent HIV? (Christopher Glazek, The New Yorker, 9/30/2013)
Selected Resources and Research on PrEP:
- PrEP Use Across the U.S. at the County-Level (AIDSVu, 4/14/2020)
- Barriers to the Wider Use of Pre-exposure Prophylaxis in the United States: A Narrative Review (Kenneth H. Mayer, Allison Agwu and David Malebranche; Advances in Therapy; 3/30/2020)
- Effect of Medicaid Expansions on HIV Diagnoses and Pre-Exposure Prophylaxis Use (Bita Fayaz Farkhad, David Holtgrave and Dolores Albarracín; American Journal of Preventive Medicine; 1/24/2021)
- Comparative Pricing of Branded Tenofovir Alafenamide–Emtricitabine Relative to Generic Tenofovir Disoproxil Fumarate–Emtricitabine for HIV Preexposure Prophylaxis (Rochelle P. Walensky, Tim Horn, Nicole C. McCann, Kenneth A. Freedberg and A. David Paltiel; Annals of Internal Medicine; 5/5/2020)
- Estimated Coverage to Address Financial Barriers to HIV Preexposure Prophylaxis Among Persons With Indications for Its Use, United States, 2015 (Dawn Smith, Michelle Van Handel, Rebecca Huggins; Journal of Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome; 12/15/2017)
Episode Credits
Guests:
- Robin Feldman, JD, Professor of Law, University of California-Hastings; Director, Center for Innovation
- Tahir Amin, LLB, LP, Co-founder and Co-executive director, Initiative for Medicines, Access and Knowledge (I-MAK)
- Oni Blackstock, MD, MS, Founder and Executive Director, Health Justice; Primary care and HIV physician
- Tim Horn, MPH, Director, Health Care Access, National Alliance of State and Territorial AIDS Directors
- Craig Garthwaite, PhD, Professor of Strategy, Kellogg School of Management at Northwestern University
The Tradeoffs theme song was composed by Ty Citerman. Additional music this episode by Blue Dot Sessions.
This episode was reported and produced by Ryan Levi and mixed by Andrew Parrella.
Special thanks to Karen Hoover, Dawn Smith, Joseph Prejean, Irene Hall, Carolina Uribe and Jacqueline Petty at the CDC.
Additional thanks to:
Sean Dickson, Lisa Oullette, Arti Rai, Stacie Dusetizina, Gus Cairns, Rich MacKinnon, Kay Marshall, Bradley Albert, Jorge Roman, Dewayne Ford, Michael Kharfen, Aaron Patillo, David Holland, David Malebranche, David Paltiel, Montica Levy, Kenyon Farrow, Matthew Rose, Michael Chancley, James Krellenstein, Peter Staley, Christopher Morten, Chris Ridley, Jose Bauermeister, Sean Bland, Patrick Sullivan, Fred Ledley, Michael Carrier, Mark Lemley, Matt Salo, Adrianne Casalotti, Lindsey Dawson, Nicholas Massoni, the Tradeoffs Advisory Board and our stellar staff!
